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Abstract
Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality 
effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being 
offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario 
instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities 
are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe 
acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be 
of particular importance in bribery experiments. 
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Externality and framing effects in a bribery experiment
1. Introduction 
This paper revisits two null findings reported by Klaus Abbink and his coauthors in 
a series of experiments designed to explore bribery. These findings are important for two 
reasons. First, they have implications relating to what types of anticorruption policies might 
usefully be pursued. And second, emerging so early in the experimental analysis of corrupt 
behavior, they could significantly influence future decisions by researchers about which 
avenues to pursue.
In 2002, Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner (AIR below) conducted 
an experiment designed to explore the effects of three aspects of the environment in which 
bribes may be offered and accepted on such corrupt behavior. Those aspects were (1) the 
fact that illegal agreements are not enforced by the rule of law, (2) that the exchange of 
bribes for corrupt services may be harmful to others and to society as a whole, and (3) that 
those engaging in such exchanges, if caught, may be severely punished. Their experiment 
involved a repeated, two-player, sequential game between a potential briber and bribee. 
Under the first of three treatments, the briber had to decide whether and how much to offer 
as a bribe without knowing whether the bribee would be willing to grant him a higher 
payoff (simulating the provision of the corrupt service) in return and the bribee was free to 
reject the bribe, accept and grant the higher payoff, or accept but not grant the higher 
payoff. If bribes were offered and higher payoffs granted, it was taken as evidence that trust 
and reciprocity were sufficient to support such exchanges. Under the second treatment, 
whenever a bribe was offered and a higher payoff granted by a briber-bribee pair all the 
other briber-bribee pairs in the same experimental session incurred a loss, and this negative 
externality was greater than the sum of the briber and bribee’s private gains. If less bribery  5
and less granting of higher payoffs was observed under this second as compared to the first 
treatment, it could be taken as evidence that individuals take account of the harm corrupt 
exchanges cause to others when deciding how to act. Finally, under the third treatment 
briber-bribee pairs engaging in corrupt exchanges faced a small probability of loosing all 
their winnings from the experiment and being excluded from subsequent play. If there was 
less bribery and less granting of higher payoffs under this third as compared to the second 
treatment, it could be taken as evidence that individuals are deterred by punishment when 
contemplating bribery.  
AIR found evidence of trust and reciprocity between briber-bribee pairs and that the 
threat of punishment significantly reduced the incidence of corrupt exchanges. However, 
they found no negative externality effect, i.e., no evidence that individuals take account of 
the harm corrupt exchanges caused to others when deciding how to act.
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Abbink and Heike Hennig-Schmidt (AHS below) investigated the possible impact 
of one further factor on briber and bribee behavior within the context of this game. AIR 
presented their games to their subjects in abstract form, being careful to never make the link 
with corruption explicit. AHS repeated the same experiment presenting the game framed. A 
firm was applying for permission to run a factory that would pollute the environment and 
had to decide whether to offer the presiding public official a bribe. In turn, the public 
official had to decide whether to accept or reject the bribe (if one was offered) and whether 
to grant the permission. Drawing on the discussions of Eckel and Grossman (1996) and 
Loomes (1999) AHS argued that by comparing behavior across the framed and unframed 
versions of the game they could identify the role played by ‘social and psychological 
factors’ (AHS, p. 104). They hypothesized that, as corruption is illegal and generally  6
viewed as immoral, subjects receiving the framed presentation of the game would be less 
likely engage in bribery. However, they found no significant effect.
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We are interested in re-examining these two null findings because they pertain to a 
particular question about the causes of corruption and to the corresponding policy debate: 
does corruption occur whenever the extrinsic incentives are insufficient to keep individuals 
honest or do intrinsic motivations also play a determining role?   
One form of intrinsic motivation, namely the tendency to reciprocate, received 
considerable attention in the work of Abbink and his coauthors: positive reciprocity within 
briber-bribee pairs was found to support corrupt-like exchanges, while negative reciprocity 
between pairs could explain why they observed no externality effect – why abstain from 
causing harm to others if you think that they are going to cause harm to you? However, 
social preferences that lead to dissatisfaction in the form of guilt when individuals view 
their own actions as immoral or as leading to reduced welfare for others may not have been 
given sufficient opportunity to surface in the AIR design. The comparison of their first and 
second treatments is a test for the existence of a preference not to do harm to others, but 
that test is confounded by the negative reciprocity effect described above. And AHS's 
experiment may be viewed as a test for the existence of a preference against acting 
immorally. However, if the frame they applied appeared ‘artificial’ to their subjects, in 
accordance with Bardsley (2005), it may have induced role play rather than triggering their 
intrinsic desire to abstain from an immoral, corrupt-like act.  
With these concerns in mind, we designed a simple, one-shot bribery game in which 
a private agent has to decide whether and how much to offer a 'public official' as a bribe in 
1 Related null findings are reported in, as yet, unpublished papers. Abbink (2005) found no impact when 
reducing the relative initial endowments of innocent third parties who suffered losses when bribes were 
offered and accepted. And in a similar game applied to non-student subjects Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, and 
Gangadharan (2005) found no impact when increasing the amount of harm caused to a third party when a 
bribe was offered and accepted.   7
exchange for a corrupt service (a higher payoff in the game) and in turn the 'public official' 
has to decide whether and how much to accept. However, in our game, a ‘public official’ 
who accepts a bribe automatically supplies the corrupt service. Thus, corruption does not 
depend on trust, reciprocity, and repeated interaction between briber and bribee.
3 Also, in 
our game those to whom harm is done when a bribe changes hands are passive victims, so 
negative reciprocity does not come into play either.
4 Further, the frame we applied was 
designed to ensure that it would not seem artificial to the subjects assuming, at least, the 
briber role in the experiment.  
These design modifications render our experiment a poor analogy to the corruption 
scenario envisaged by AIR and AHS: for businesses in contexts where bribery is a 
consideration, reciprocal negative externalities undoubtedly exist, and delays, uncertainties, 
and ambiguities relating to the delivery of the corrupt services they require often render 
trust, reciprocity and repeated exchange between bribers and bribees important.  
However, corrupt exchanges do not only take place between public officials and 
businesses. Indeed, especially in less developed countries, many corrupt transactions take 
place between public officials or public service providers and ordinary citizens endeavoring 
to avoid fines and court summonses, jump queues, ascend waiting lists, and secure better 
services. And the characteristics of exchanges such as these are somewhat different. Often 
both sides of the exchange are executed more or less simultaneously rendering trust, 
reciprocity and repetition unnecessary.
5 Further, the reason why such corrupt exchanges, 
while being labeled ‘petty’, nevertheless remain a cause for concern among policy-makers 
2 Subsequent bribery experiments have been framed with no attempts to investigate framing effects (see, for 
example, Cameron et al. (2005), Bilotkach (2006)).  
3 Levitt and List (2006) noted that one-shot games “can parse the ‘social preference reciprocity’ explanation 
from the ‘repeated game reciprocity’ explanation” (pp. 21). 
4 In Abbink (2005) and Cameron et al. (2005), it is not other briber-bribee pairs that suffer a loss whenever a 
bribe is offered and accepted but a number of 'other members of society', i.e., other subjects who do not have 
the option to engage in bribery themselves. 
5 Consider, for example, the case where a hospital patient requires a change of linen and offers a bribe to a 
nurse in exchange for having it done immediately.  8
is that they often cause harm to others who are unable to engage in bribery themselves.
6 In 
developing countries both poverty and petty corruption are widespread and concerns over 
the resulting inequities are fuelling a wide range of policy initiatives, many being designed 
with reference to theory as there is very little empirical evidence relating to how the 
decision to bribe might be influenced (Svensson, 2005). 
The resulting experiment provides evidence of both an externality and a framing 
effect and, thereby, suggests that intrinsic motivations do play a determining role in 
corruption. However, in accordance with Bardsley’s (2005) artificiality hypothesis, the 
effect of framing is seen only among subjects in the ‘private citizen’ role: the role of 
‘Public servant’, it seems, remains too artificial despite the focus on a corruption scenario 
that at least some of our subjects are likely to have experienced either directly or indirectly. 
The paper has five sections. Following this introduction, in section 2, we describe 
our experimental design and explain one further deviation from AHS and AIR. Then, we 
present a number of behavioral predictions relating to different assumptions about intrinsic 
motivations or social preferences and, with reference to these predictions and to Bardsley’s 
(2005) artificiality hypothesis, explain the treatments we apply. In section 3, we introduce 
our participants, and in section 4 we present our results. In section 5, we review our 
findings, paying particular attention to the points are which they differ from those of AHS 
and AIR, and draw some tentative conclusions. 
6 Building on the example just presented, a poor patient who cannot afford the bribe may be left in unchanged 
linen longer as a result of another patient bribing and thereby jumping the queue. See Transparency 
International (2006) for more examples.  9
2. Experimental Design, Predictions and Treatments 
2.1 A simple bribery game 
Each ‘private citizen’ receives an initial endowment, Yc, and may offer a ‘bribe’, b,
in exchange for a corrupt service, the value of which to him is V. If he offers a bribe, 
regardless of its magnitude and whether it is accepted or rejected by the ‘public official’, he 
incurs a cost E. This represents the expected cost of being caught and punished.
7 So, the 
‘private citizen’s’ final payoff is:-
Fc = Yc  if he chooses not to offer a bribe;  
 =  Yc – E + V– b  if he offers a bribe and the bribe is accepted; and 
 =  Yc – E  if he offers a bribe and the bribe is rejected. 
Each ‘public official’ receives an initial endowment of Yp. If he accepts a bribe he 
automatically has to supply the corrupt service and incur a cost, K.  This represents the sum 
of the expected cost of being caught and punished, the cost of supplying the service, and the 
cost of efforts made to reduce the likelihood of capture.
8 So, the ‘public official’s’ final 
payoff is:-
Fp = Yp  if he is not offered a bribe;  
 =  Yp  if he is offered but does not accept a bribe; and 
 =  Yp – K + b  if he accepts a bribe. 
Finally, each ‘other member of society’ receives an initial endowment, Yo, and for 
every bribe offered and accepted he incurs a cost, h. So, each ‘other member of society’s’ 
final payoff is Fo= Yo – Nch, where Nc{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the number of ‘private citizen’-
‘public official’ pairs who offer and accept bribes. 
7 We chose to make this cost deterministic rather than stochastic in order to reduce the potential impact of risk 
preferences on observed behavior. As with reciprocity, minimizing the role played by risk attitudes increases 
the likelihood of identifying preferences against immoral acts and doing harm to others. In another 
experiment, not reported here, we introduce two different treatments involving probabilistic punishment.  10
If all ‘public officials’ and ‘private citizens’ are selfish money-maximizers, and we 
treat play as sequential, this game has the following sub-game perfect equilibrium: each 
‘public official’ will accept any bribe that leaves him better off, i.e., he will accept any 
b>K, and will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting b=K; assuming ‘private 
citizens’ know this, they will all offer bribes of K+ , where   is a small positive amount; 
and all bribes (=K+ ) will be accepted, so each ‘other member of society’ will suffer the 
maximum possible negative externality of 5h. We will refer to this as the selfish money 
maximizing equilibrium or SMME below.
9
Note that, in addition to being one shot, having an SMME in which everyone is 
corrupt, and including passive victims, this game deviates from AIR’ and AHS’s in one last 
detail. We do not triple the bribes offered by the bribers before passing them on to the 
bribees. AIR’ and AHS’s rationale for this multiplication was that the marginal utility of 
any given bribe was likely to be greater for a public official than for a business person, due 
to the latter being richer. Given that our game is more analogous to acts of petty corruption, 
this rationale does not apply as there is little evidence to suggest that public service 
providers are significantly poorer than service recipients in developing countries. So, we 
leave bribes unaltered when passing them between bribers and bribees. 
2.2 Predicting externality and framing effects with reference to social preferences
One way of modeling the impact on behavior of social preferences of the type we 
described in the introduction is to assume that a ‘public official’ who causes harm to others 
or engages in an act that she perceives as immoral suffers a psychological cost, Mp=Mp(h,s)
8 Again, we chose to make this cost deterministic rather than stochastic in order to reduce the potential impact 
of risk preferences on observed behavior. 
9 Note that in AIR’ and AHS’s experiments the SMME involved no bribery because trust was a prerequisite to 
offering a bribe. In Cameron et al (2005) the SMME involved the maximum possible bribe because the value 
of the corrupt service increased proportionately with the bribe offered. By setting the SMME bribe at neither  11
with Mp>0 if h>0, dMp/dh>0, dMp/ds>0, and where s captures the degree to which the act is 
perceived as immoral. Similarly, a ‘private citizen’ who causes harm to others or engages in 
an act that she perceives as immoral suffers a psychological cost, Mc=Mc(h,s) with Mc>0 if 
h>0, dMc/dh>0, dMc/ds>0. Now, leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged and 
assuming no other social preferences, we can make a number of predictions. 
Prediction 1.  ‘Public officials’ will now only accept b>K+Mp(h,s). So, an increase in 
either h or s will lead to an increase in ‘public officials’ minimum acceptable bribes.  
Prediction 2.   Any ‘public official’ for whom Mp(h,s)>bmax–K, where bmax is the maximum 
possible bribe in the game, will always reject. So, if Mp~F(.), over some range of h and s,
the proportion of ‘public officials’ who reject all possible bribes, 1–F(bmax-K), will increase 
following an increase in either h or s, or both.
Prediction 3.  A ‘private citizen’ who believes Mp~F ˆ (.) will offer no bribe if the net total 
private value of the corrupt service is insufficient to cover the sum of his own and his best 
guess of the ‘public official’s’ psychological costs, i.e., if Mc(h,s)+ p M ˆ (h,s)> E K V   ,
where p M ˆ  satisfies the first order condition  p M K V ˆ   =F ˆ ( p M ˆ )/ f ˆ ( p M ˆ ). So, as long as 
d p M ˆ /dh = 0 and d p M ˆ /ds = 0 (a reasonable assumptions that would apply in the case of 
most common probability distributions), an increase in either h or s, or both, will also lead 
to an increase in the proportion of ‘private citizens’ who choose not to bribe.
                                                                                                                               
the minimum (zero) nor the maximum possible amount, we reduce the likelihood of our findings being 
spurious, i.e., based on participant errors alone.   12
Prediction 4.   If Mc(h,s)+ p M ˆ < V-K-E, the ‘private citizen’ will offer a bribe of K+ p M ˆ . So, 
if we assume that d p M ˆ /dh > 0 and d p M ˆ /ds > 0, an increase in h or s, or both, will lead to 
an increase in the bribes offered by ‘private citizens’. 
2.3 Parameterization and treatments 
In our experiment we used a fictitious currency called a Gilpet (G1 = £0.20, 
approximately $0.35 at the time of the experiment), set Yc=Yp=G35, Yo=G25, V=G16, 
E=G1, K=G5, and, for reasons that will be explained below, set h equal to either G1 or G4. 
‘Private citizens’ could choose any b{G1, G2, G3,…G20} and recall that ‘public 
officials’, instead of responding only to the particular bribe offered to them by the ‘private 
citizen’ with whom they were paired, had to state whether they would accept or reject each 
of the possible bribes, b{G1, G2, G3,…G20}, while knowing that whichever one of their 
responses turned out to be pertinent would determine their earnings. This full strategy 
elicitation enabled us to identify ‘public officials’ who would reject any possible bribe and 
the minimum acceptable bribe for each of the others.






(negative externalities low) 
3 sessions 
(45 participants, 15 in each role) 
3 sessions 
(45 participants, 15 in each role) 
h=hH=G4 
(negative externalities high) 
3 sessions 
(45 participants, 15 in each role) 
4 sessions 
(60 participants, 20 in each role) 
We varied the magnitude of h, the negative externality caused by a bribe being 
offered and accepted, setting it either low, h=hL=G1, in which case bribery was Pareto-
improving, or high, h=hH=G4, in which case bribery was Pareto-worsening. This contrasts 
with AIR who compared a treatment involving Pareto-worsening negative externalities with  13
a control in which there was no externality at all. Arguably, ceteris paribus, a significant 
externality effect is less likely to be observed within our experiment as a result. 
To perturb s, the likelihood that bribery within the experiment was perceived as 
immoral, like AHS, we applied a frame. However, taking heed of Bardsley (2005), we 
applied a frame in which the proposed corrupt exchange was between a citizen and a public 
official rather than a business and a public official. To set s=sL the game was explained in 
abstract terms: those taking the ‘private citizen’ role were referred to as ‘Player As’, those 
taking the ‘public official’ role were referred to as ‘Player Bs’, ‘other members of society’ 
were referred to as ‘Player Cs’, bribes were simply referred to as ‘offers’, and no mention 
was made of corrupt services. And to set s=sH >sL the game was described using the labels 
‘private citizen’, ‘public official’, ‘other members of society’, and ‘bribe’.  
As students are citizens, this frame is not inviting them to role play and abrogate 
responsibility for offering a bribe by arguing, to themselves at least, that they were simply 
doing what a business person would do. Rather, this frame invites them to think about 
whether they themselves would engage in bribery. Of course, this frame does not solve the 
artificiality problem applying to those in the ‘public servant’ role and, this being the case, if 
Bardsley’s (2005) artificiality argument applies, we should expect the effect of framing on 
‘public servants’ behavior to be less marked than the effect of framing on ‘private citizen’ 
behavior. Thus, our experiment provides a partial test of whether Bardsley’s theory applies 
to bribery experiments.
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2.4 Practical details 
We conducted 13 experimental sessions each involving 15 participants. Table 1 
shows the distribution of sessions with respect to h and s. All the experimental sessions  14
took place during the final quarter of 2005 in seminar rooms in the Department of 
Economics, Oxford University. In every session the participants were seated at well spaced 
desks. The game was explained verbally by one of the authors (the same one in all sessions) 
following a predefined script and using visual aids in the form of overhead projector slides. 
Each participant received two tables showing how various possible decision combinations 
lead to particular final payoffs for each player-type. The participants expressed their 
decisions on specially designed forms which they completed behind privacy screens to 
ensure that they were not overlooked. No talking was allowed.
11
Once the game was completed, the participants’ payoffs were calculated at the front 
of the seminar room and a show-up fee of £3 ($5.29) was added. In the meantime, the 
participants filled out a questionnaire.
12
3. Experimental participants 
Our 195 participants were all students at the University of Oxford. Some signed up 
at a stall set up by us at the Annual Freshers’ Fare, an event at the start of each academic 
year designed to facilitate recruitment by student societies and other activity-based groups. 
The remainder contacted us having seen promotional posters and leaflets advertising the 
study or having received e-mails through their departmental or college mailing lists.  
Table 2 describes our participant sample. Ages ranged from 18 to 44 years, with the 
average age being just under 24 years. Just over half of the students were female. All the 
major world religions were represented in the sample, although less than one third of the 
participants described themselves as religious. Fifteen percent were only children. Just 
                                                                                                                               
10 A complete test would also investigate the effect of framing on the behavior of real public servants when 
placed in the experimental role of ‘public servant’.   
11 The students in the role of “other members of society” simply waited while the ‘citizens’ and ‘officials’ 
made their decisions. 
12 The experimental scripts, visual aids, questionnaires and forms designed for and used during the experiment 
are available from the authors.  15
under one third were studying economics. Despite the random assignment, the participants 
under the high externality treatment were marginally but significantly older (24.40 as 
compared to 23.22 years). According to Chi-squared and t-tests, none of the other 
characteristics vary significantly across assigned roles. 
Table 2: Participant characteristics 
All participants 'Private citizens' 'Public officials'
'Other members 
of society'
Average age in years 23.86 24.22 23.86 23.49
(4.46) (4.72) (4.33) (4.35)
Female 51.28% 49.23% 50.77% 53.85%
Described self as religious 29.74% 32.31% 33.85% 23.08%
An only child 15.38% 10.77% 20.00% 15.38%
Studying economics 28.21% 32.31% 33.85% 18.46%
Number of observations 195 65 65 65
Note: The standard deviations for the continuous variable, age, are reported in parentheses. 
4. Results 
The data generated by our experiment is presented in Figures 1 to 6 and Tables 3 
and 4. All the figures contain histograms showing, in the case of ‘private citizens’, the 
frequencies with which each of the possible bribes was offered and, in the case of ‘public 
officials’, the frequencies with which each of the possible minimum acceptable bribes was 
observed.  Note that those offering or accepting no bribe have been placed at the right- 
rather than the left-hand end of their respective histograms. For ‘public officials’ this is 
because, given the math of the game, accepting no bribe implies a minimum acceptable 
bribe of 21 or more. So, by placing ‘no bribe’ on the right, we ensure that the total 
psychological cost implied by each possible decision increases as we move rightwards on 
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Figure 1: Bribes offered by ‘private citizens’ in the bribery game 
Figure 1 shows that of the ‘private citizens’ only 18 percent offered the SMME 
bribe of G6, while 76 percent offered a higher bribe or no bribe at all: 26 percent offered no 
bribe; 37 percent offered a bribe of G10; 1 percent offered of G11; and 10 percent offered 
between G6 and G10. Only 6 percent offered below the SMME, possibly in error.
The strong mode at G10 is worthy of note. A bribe of G10, if accepted, leads to 
equivalent final payoffs for the ‘private citizen’ and ‘public official’ or, put another way, it 
divides the net return to corruption equally between the two parties. Referring back to the 
simple model described above, offering a bribe of G10 is consistent with the ‘private 
citizens’ believing that the ‘public officials’ need G4 to compensate them for the 
psychological costs associated with engaging in bribery. That 37 percent of the private 
citizens should share this belief seems unrealistic. More realistic is the possibility that 
‘private citizens’, perceiving no real difference between themselves and the ‘public 
officials’ from which their partner is to be drawn, believe that both of them are equally 
deserving of compensation. For ‘private citizens’ engaging in this type of thought process 
Prediction 4 does not apply and this will reduce any observed effect of a higher s and h on 
the bribes offered by the bribing sample as a whole. Note, however, that Prediction 3 
remains just as salient for ‘private citizens’ engaging in this type of thought process. 17
In Figure 2 and Table 3 we investigate the effects of changing the magnitude of the 
negative externality on bribe offering. The graphs are based on the full sample, pooled 
across the abstract and framed treatments. In Table 3 we present tests based on both the 
pooled sample and the abstract and framed samples separately. In accordance with 
Prediction 3 (section 2.2 above), in the pooled sample ‘Private citizens’ were significantly 
(5% level) less likely to offer bribes when the externality was high, i.e., when bribery 
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Figure 2: The effect of negative externalities on bribes offered 
In accordance with Prediction 4, we also see an increase in the mean bribe offered, 
conditional on offering a bribe at all, when the negative externality was increased. 
However, this increase is only significant (10% level) according to a one tailed t-test, the 
power of which may be questionable given the non-normality of our data, and is not 
significant according to a non-parametric, rank-sum test. 
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 we conduct the same series of tests for the sample 
who played the game in abstract form, while in columns 6 and 7 we conduct them for the 
sample who played the game under the corruption frame. The results in columns 4 and 5 
show that, when the game was presented in abstract form, the increase in the negative 
externality induced ‘private citizens’ to offer larger bribes. However, the resulting intrinsic  18
moral costs were not large enough to induce significantly ‘more citizens’ to abstain from 
bribery. In contrast, columns 6 and 7 show that, when the game was framed, the increase in 
the negative externality was sufficient to reduce the proportion of ‘private citizens’ who 
chose to engage in bribery. However, those who chose to bribe nevertheless did not offer 
higher bribes, possibly because of a selection effect; those who choose to bribe when both h
and s were high were more likely to be selfish money maximizers.
Table 3: Externality effects on ‘private citizen’ behavior in the bribery game 
          Full Sample  Abstract Form  Corruption Frame 






















'Private Citizens'     
 Offered no bribe  26.15%  13.33% 37.14%  6.67%  13.33% 20.00% 55.00% 
 Observations  65  30 35 15 15 15 20 
 Chi-squared tests p-values  0.029  0.543  0.036 
 Mean bribe offered  8.04  7.5 8.68 6.5 8.85  8.67  8.44 
 Observations  48  26 22 14 13  12  9 
 t-tests (one tailed) p-values  0.055 0.008 0.415 
 Rank-sum tests (two-tailed) p-values  0.332  0.032  0.304 
In Figure 3 and Table 4 we investigate the effects of framing the game on bribe 
offering. The graphs are based on the full sample, pooled across the low and high 
externality treatments. In Table 4 we present tests based on both the pooled sample and the 
low and high externality samples separately. In accordance with Prediction 3, in the pooled 
sample ‘private citizens’ were significantly (1% level) less likely to offer bribes when the 
corruption frame was applied, i.e., when the likelihood of the ‘private citizens’ perceiving 
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Figure 3: The effect of framing on bribes offered 
In accordance with Prediction 4, conditional on offering a bribe at all, a higher mean 
bribe was offered when the game was framed. However, this effect is insignificant 
according both the rank-sum and the one tailed t-test. 
In Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 we conduct the same series of tests for the sample 
who played the game involving the low negative externality, while in columns 6 and 7 we 
conduct them for the sample who played the game involving the high negative externality. 
The results in columns 4 and 5 show that, when the externality was low, framing the game 
induced ‘private citizens’ to offer larger bribes. However, the resulting moral costs were not 
large enough to induce significantly more to abstain from corruption. In contrast, columns 6 
and 7 show that, when the externality was high, framing the game was sufficient to reduce 
the proportion of ‘private citizens’ who chose to engage in bribery. However, those who 
chose to bribe nevertheless did not increase the bribes they offered, again, possibly because 
of a selection effect.
13
                                                
13 To check the robustness of these results, we conducted Probit analyses taking bribe offering as the 
dependent variable and treatment dummies and their interaction and the individual characteristics presented in 
Table 2 as independent variables. Controlling for individual characteristics leaves all the findings reported 
above unaltered.  20
Table 4: Framing effects on ‘private citizen’ behavior in the bribery game 


























'Private Citizens'                   
  Offered no bribe  26.15%  10.00%  40.00%  6.67%  20.00% 13.33% 55.00% 
  Observations  65  30 35 15 15  15  20 
 Chi-squared  tests  p-values  0.006  0.283  0.012 
        
  Mean bribe offered  8.04  7.62  8.57  6.3  8.67 8.84 8.44 
  Observations  48  27 21 14 12  13 9 
  t-tests (one tailed) p-values  0.104  0.034  0.300 
  rank-sum tests (two-tailed) p-values  0.151  0.04  0.532 
           
We now turn to the ‘public official’. Figure 4 presents a histogram of the ‘public 
officials’ minimum acceptable bribes (MABs) pooled across all treatments. Forty percent of 
the ‘public officials’ would have accepted bribes equal to the SMME of G6 or more and 6 
percent would have accepted the break-even bribe of G5 or more. However, 18 percent 
would not accept any bribe, 11 percent chose a MAB of G10, 6 percent indicated MABs 
above G10, and 18 percent chose MABs between G6 and G10. Here, compared with the 
data on bribes offered, we see a much weaker mode at the equitable division bribe of G10.
14
This mode, weak as it is, indicates that the equitable division between briber and bribee 
could have been a reference point for some ‘public officials’. However, focusing on the 
MAB derived from data elicited using the strategy method reduces the likelihood of this 
compromising our ability to test Prediction 1.
                                                
14 This should come as no surprise to those familiar with Ultimatum Games in which the strategy method is 
applied to the responder. There a strong mode is usually seen at the equitable offer, while minimum 
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Figure 4: ‘Public officials’ minimum acceptable bribes in the bribery game 
In Figure 5 and Table 5 we investigate the effects of changing the magnitude of the 
negative externality on bribe acceptance. The graphs are based on the full sample, pooled 
across the abstract and framed treatments. In Table 5 we present tests based on both the 
pooled sample and the abstract and framed samples separately. In accordance with 
Prediction 2, in the pooled sample ‘public officials’ were significantly (5% level) more 
likely to reject all bribes when the externality was high. i.e., when greater harm was done to 
‘other members of society’ when bribes were offered and accepted. The increase in the 
mean MAB, conditional on accepting at least one of the possible bribes, when the negative 
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Figure 5: The effect of negative externalities on minimum acceptable bribes  22
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 we conduct the same series of tests for the sample 
who played the game in abstract form, while in columns 6 and 7 we conduct them for the 
sample who played the game under the corruption frame. The results in columns 4 and 5 
show that, when the game was presented in abstract form, the increase in the externality 
induced a significantly (10% level) greater proportion of the ‘public officials’ to abstain 
from bribe acceptance. However, while the average MAB conditional on accepting some 
bribe is greater in the high externality treatment, it is not significantly so. Finally, in 
columns 6 and 7 we see that, under the corruption frame the higher externality was 
associated with neither a significant decline in the proportion of ‘public officials’ accepting 
a bribe nor a significant increase in the MAB. 
Table 5: Externality effects on ‘public official’ behavior in the bribery game 
          Full Sample  Abstract Form  Corruption Frame 






















'Public Servants'            
 Accepted no bribe  18.46%  6.67% 28.57% 0.00% 20.00%  13.33%  35.00% 
 Observations  65  30 35 15 15 15 20 
 Chi-squared tests p-values  0.023 0.068 0.147 

Mean minimum acceptable 
bribe 7.54 7.39  7.72  7.6  7.92 7.15  7.53 
 Observations  53  28 25 15 12  13 13 
 t-tests (one tailed) p-values  0.33  0.379  0.374 
   Rank-sum tests (two-tailed) p-values  0.909  0.672  0.509 
In Figure 6 and Table 6 we investigate the effects of framing the game on bribe 
acceptance. The graphs are based on the full sample, pooled across the low and high 
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Figure 6: The effect of framing on minimum acceptable bribes 
  In Table 6 we present tests based on both the pooled sample and the low and high 
externality samples separately. Here, we see that in accordance with Prediction 2, the 
proportion of ‘public servants’ who reject all bribes is higher under the framed treatment. 
However, this effect is insignificant in both the pooled sample and each of the sub-samples. 
And finally, the effects of the frame on the MAB are both inconsistent with Prediction 1 
and insignificant.
15
Table 6: Framing effects on ‘public servant’ behavior in the bribery game 


























'Public Servants'                   
  Accepted no bribe  18.46%  10.00%  25.71%  0.00%  13.33% 20.00% 35.00% 
  Observations  65  30 35 15 15  15  20 
 Chi-squared  tests  p-values  0.104  0.143  0.331 
                     
Mean minimum acceptable 
bribe 7.54  7.74  7.34  7.6  7.15 7.92 7.54 
  Observations  53  27 26 15 13  12  13 
  t-tests (one tailed) p-values  0.703  0.295  0.387 
   rank-sum tests (two-tailed) p-values  0.372  0.789  0.362 
                                                
15 To check the robustness of these results, we conducted Probit analyses based on the various sub-samples to 
which the Chi-squared tests are applied above, taking bribe acceptance as the dependent variable and 
treatment dummies and the individual characteristics presented in Table 2 as independent variables. 
Controlling for individual characteristics leaves all the findings reported above unaltered.   24
5. Summary and Discussion 
In contrast to AIR, AHS, and indeed Cameron et al. (2005) and Abbink (2005), we 
find evidence of both an externality effect and a framing effect within the context of a 
bribery game. When the game was framed as a petty corruption scenario and the negative 
externalities suffered by innocent victims when bribes change hands were high, subjects in 
the ‘private citizen’ role were less likely to offer bribes, although when only one of these 
treatments was applied, they tended to raise the bribe they offered rather than choosing to 
abstain. When the game was presented in abstract form, increasing the negative 
externalities suffered by innocent victims also increased the likelihood that subjects in the 
‘public official’ role would reject all bribes. However, framing did not affect ‘public 
officials’ behavior and also appeared to suppress the externality effect.
In general, the findings are consistent with a simple model of bribery in the 
presence of a preference for abstaining from actions that do harm to others and may be 
considered immoral, although the absence of a framing effect and, indeed, an externality 
effect in the presence of the frame for ‘public officials’ is worthy of note. These null 
findings suggest that the petty corruption frame that we applied, while serving its purpose 
well in the case of subjects placed in the role of ‘private citizens’, may have appeared 
artificial and thereby induced role play among the subjects placed in the role of ‘public 
servants’ in accordance with Bardsley (2005).
We assign our success relative to AHS in identifying a framing effect on briber 
behavior to the fact that our frame would have seemed less artificial to student subjects than 
AHS’s. However, we note that our frame would not have been appropriate for the analysis 
of the corrupt scenario that AIR and AHS had in mind. Although, by the same token, AIR’ 
and AHS’s frame would not have been appropriate for the analysis of petty corruption. And 
we assign our success relative to AIR and AHS in identifying an externality effect to the  25
fact that our game design precluded any role for positive reciprocity within briber-bribee 
pairs and for negative reciprocity between briber-bribee pairs. However, we note that our 
game design would not have been appropriate for the analysis of the corruption scenario 
that AIR and AHS had in mind. Although, by the same token, AIR’ and AHS’s game 
design would not have been appropriate for the analysis of petty corruption. If one takes the 
appropriateness of the designs and frames to each of the scenarios under analysis as given 
and temporarily put aside concerns about artificiality, one could tentatively conclude that, 
while a preference for not doing harm to others might reduce a citizen’s tendency to engage 
in petty corruption the same preference is unlikely to come into play when it is a business 
person contemplating bribery and when the others in question are his or her competitors. 
This seems entirely reasonable. 
Finally, we wish to draw attention to an element of our design that may not accord 
with real instances of petty corruption: in the game our subjects knew exactly how much 
harm they were causing to others, while in real life it remains unclear whether and how 
much harm is caused to others by petty corruption and it is, therefore, all too easy for 
individuals, intent on improving their own lot, to turn a blind eye. Taking this observation 
in conjunction with our findings we can draw two tentative policy conclusions from our 
analysis. First, there is a need for more, scientific research into the externality effects 
associated with real petty corruption. And, second, assuming that this research found 
evidence of negative externalities, campaigns designed to raise awareness about the harm 
petty corruption causes others could reduce citizen engagement in petty corruption and, 
possibly, cause them to seek other ways to improve the public services they receive. 26
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